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Section 144(1) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012,
LASPOA 2012, created the offence of squatting in a residential building. It entered into force
on 1st September 2012 and there is no exemption for persons already squatting on that date.
The first person was arrested on 2nd September 2012, convicted, and sentenced to 12 weeks
imprisonment.1 Up to September 2013, in the London Metropolitan Police area, 247 people
had been arrested, 112 charged, 101 convicted and 22 imprisoned.2 While it is questionable
whether this measure was actually necessary to enhance the protection given to home owners
when faced with stubborn squatters,3 it was supported by politicians of all persuasions.4
Importantly, it does not criminalise all residential squatting and says nothing about trespass
onto commercial or agricultural premises. Thus, the offence is not committed by a person
who was a licensee or tenant when they entered the premises and who subsequently holds
over,5 it applies only to trespass in a “residential building” (and not, for example, to land in
the curtilage of a building); and only if the person is “living” in the building or “intends to
live there for any period”.6 In other words, simply being on residential property does not
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4 13 MPS voted against, after 90 minutes of debate.
5 LASPOA 2012, s.144(1)(a).
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mean an offence is committed and that simple fact cannot be taken as evidence that the
squatting was “criminal”. Further, and perhaps as a reflection of the haphazard way in which
the offence came to be created, LASPOA 2012 does not tell us how, if at all, the commission
of this offence interacts with the law of adverse possession. If a person commits the criminal
offence, does this prevent them acquiring title by adverse possession, assuming all the other
elements of a possessory claim are established? This was the issue in Best v Chief Land
Registrar and Secretary of State for Justice.7
Mr Best had taken possession of a rundown dwelling in 2000 and applied to be
registered as proprietor in November 2012 in pursuance of the scheme in Schedule 6 to the
Land Registration Act 2002. This requires ten years adverse possession by the possessor
immediately prior to the application for registration, but the application triggers the
provisions of the Schedule whereby the existing registered proprietor has two years to evict
the possessor unless one of the three exceptions applies.8 There is no automatic acquisition of
title now that the LRA 2002 is in force, unless the claimant had met all of the conditions for
success (including completion of a full 12 years adverse possession under the Limitation Act
1980) prior to the entry into force of the 2002 Act. However, Best never made it as far as
triggering Schedule 6 because the Chief Land Registrar cancelled his application on the basis
that title could never be acquired by virtue of a criminal act. This was based on the Land
Registry’s own assessment of the affect of LASPOA 2012 on the law of adverse possession,
announced shortly after the entry into force of LASPOA 2012.9 The only avenue open to Best
in such circumstances was judicial review of the Registrar’s decision to cancel his application
and so the matter came before Ouseley J in the administrative court.
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The Registrar’s decision to nail the colours to the mast by asserting that “criminal
squatting” under LASPOA 2012 necessarily prevented the acquisition of title by adverse
possession was a brave one. First, LASPOA 2012 is utterly silent on the point and there is no
evidence at all that the matter was even considered during the relatively swift introduction of
the offence. Parliament appears to have been more concerned to criminalise the behaviour of
residential squatters than work out the consequences. At the very least, the Chief Land
Registrar might have thought that the omission was material and thereby erred on the safe
side by maintaining the status quo rather than rushing to judgment a bare month after the
offence came on stream. Secondly, in similar vein, the Registrar might have considered
whether the “comprehensive and carefully balanced statutory answer” 10 to a claim to title
based on adverse possession found in the LRA 2002 was intended to be disturbed by a side
wind, especially given the legislature’s silence. Thirdly, and perhaps most surprisingly, how
did the Chief Land Registrar know that Best had committed a criminal offence? As noted, the
offence is not committed simply by being in a residential building, and the presumption that
Best must have been guilty offends against some fairly fundamental tenets of the common
law. While it might, but only might, have been the case that a person convicted of “criminal
squatting” could not thereafter make a claim based on adverse possession during the period of
criminal activity, there is nothing in LASPOA 2012 or anywhere else that justifies the
Registrar treating an applicant as if they had committed such an offence, even more so by
administrative determination. In the result, Ouseley J decided robustly and as a matter of
principle, that the potential commission of an offence under LASPOA 2012 did not prevent
an applicant establishing title by adverse possession. Consequently, Best can now proceed
under Schedule 6 LRA 2002, although given the publicity this case has generated it seems
10 Best at [53] per Ouseley J.
likely that that there will be an objection to his registration sufficient ultimately to deny him
title.
The Registrar’s position was based on R (Smith) v Land Registry,11 a decision of HHJ
Judge Pelling sitting as a High Court Judge, which indicted that an unlawful act (obstruction)
could not support a claim to adverse possession of a highway. Ouseley J was urged to follow
this. The judge noted, however, that the decision denying Smith’s claim had been upheld by
the Court of Appeal on different grounds (that is, that a highway was ipso facto incapable of
adverse possession – R (on the application of Smith) v Land Registry12) and that there was
persuasive (but not binding) House of Lords authority which indicated that, in some
circumstances, an unlawful act was no bar to establishing a proprietary right. So, in Bakewell
Land Management Ltd v Brandwood,13 the House had decided that the offence of driving
across a common under s.193(4) of the Law of Property Act 1925 did not prevent the
acquisition of an easement of way by prescription where the very act complained of was the
basis of the prescriptive claim. Thus, while Ouseley J recognised that he could not depart
from Smith (at first instance) unless he had compelling reasons to do so, he was of the view
that such compelling reasons existed. In essence, in the absence of any indication in
LASPOA 2012 itself, or the materials which led to the enactment of s.144, it boiled down to a
question of principle. There was, of course, the “general and fundamental principle of public
policy that a person should not be entitled to take advantage of his own criminal acts to create
rights to which a Court should then give effect”.14 But this was not “an absolute rule or
principle, unyielding to any circumstance. It is the starting point and not necessarily the end
11 [2009] EWHC 328 (Admin).
12 [2010] EWCA Civ 200, [2010] 3 WLR 1223.
13 [2004] UKHL 14, [2004] 2 AC 519.
14 Best at [44].
point”.15 Indeed, in the context of adverse possession, tortious acts (trespass) were by
definition capable of supporting a claim to title and many cases of adverse possession will
have begun with an act apparently contrary to the criminal law (breaking and entering
perhaps, as may have occurred in Lambeth LBC v Blackburn16). The question was, therefore,
whether LAPSOA 2012 was intended to modify the common law concept of “adverse
possession” so that acts which constituted the new offence now fell outside the doctrine,
when tortious and other criminal acts fell within it.17 Ouseley J could not be persuaded that
LAPSOA 2012 had this effect, especially because the “public interests which lie behind
enabling a trespasser to acquire title by adverse possession, and, after a shorter period to
apply for registration as the proprietor of registered land are clear”.18
At the doctrinal level, Ouseley J’s reasons for departing from Smith (at first instance)
and favouring Bakewell appear sound. The ratio of Smith in the Court of Appeal is that it is
impossible per se to acquire title to a public highway and the question of the illegality (or
otherwise) of the possessor’s acts were immaterial to this outcome. At first instance HHJ
Pelling did not have the benefit of the full argument presented to Ouseley J, and a different
statute was in play. However, it is also clear that Ouseley J has more fundamental objections
to the first instance decision in Smith: “[t]he issue is I think more complex than the simple
application of one fundamental principle of public policy. I do not think that the simple
principle that where the act of possession is an offence, no adverse possession can arise, is
correct. It ignores the countervailing public interest, and misses the point of what is, to my
mind, by far the strongest authority: Bakewell”.19 Indeed, Bakewell demonstrates that
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17 For example, acts contrary to Criminal Law Act 1977 s.7.
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criminal unlawfulness is not necessarily a bar to a proprietary claim. So, when the relevant
act (squatting) is unlawful only because of the absence of the right which the relevant act is
attempting to establish, it can yield to countervailing public policy considerations. Formally,
Parliament “must have thought that criminalising trespass therefore would have no effect on
the operation of adverse possession for registered, and indeed unregistered land”.20 After all,
the point of LAPSOA 2012 was to provide a quick remedy for house owners faced with
stubborn squatters. It was not, per se, to undermine establish doctrines of property law.
At the more general level, Best reminds us that “the application of the ex turpi causa
maxim depends on context”21 something which is not new in matters of real property but
worth saying nonetheless: Bakewell and Tinsley v Milligan.22 Further, and of considerable
practical import, Best recognises the policy value in accepting some claims to title based on
adverse possession; a value that is strong enough to require explicit Parliamentary authority
before the delicate compromise found in the LRA 2002 can be unbalanced. Of course,
LAPSOA 2012 could be amended to ensure that a conviction, or even the possibility of a
conviction, bars a claim to adverse possession, and given that there are attempts to include
commercial premises within its ambit, this possibility cannot be discounted. But as things
stand, Best resolves an ambiguity left by LAPSOA 2012 and, no doubt, will be greeted with
joy and outrage in equal measure. The reaction of the Land Registry is unknown.
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